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Toward the “Fullest Freedom”: Defining Section 7 
Stakeholders in NLRB Unit Determinations* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, organized labor is a shell of its former self.1 
Unions currently represent only 10.7% of American workers, 
compared to roughly 33% in the 1950s.2 In the private sector, only 
6.5% of workers are union members.3 Yet, despite the lack of union 
membership in the American workforce, 60% of Americans view 
labor unions favorably.4 The steady decline of organized labor is due 
to many economic and industrial factors beyond the scope of this 
Recent Development.5 Nonetheless, an awareness of the vitality of 
organized labor provides a useful context to any discussion involving 
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”). This 
context is important because the policies and rulings of the NLRB, 
the agency tasked with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act6 
(“NLRA” or “the Act”), play a significant role in the existence of 
organized labor and unions.7 With organized labor in decline, there 
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 1. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union 
Members – 2017 (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SY62-TSQ3] (noting that the union membership rate was 10.7% in 2017, 
compared to 20.1% in 1983). For an overview on the public’s opinion of unions, see 
generally Shiva Maniam, Most Americans See Labor Unions, Corporations Favorably, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/most-
americans-see-labor-unions-corporations-favorably/ [https://perma.cc/B7RE-CFD4]. 
 2. Jordan Yadoo, Union Membership Rate in U.S. Held at Record Low of 10.7% in 
2017, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/
document/P2TJSZ6JIJUP [https://perma.cc/4DZW-Z4TS (dark archive)].  
 3. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Table 3. 
Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, 
2016-17 Annual Averages (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M878-FLRX].  
 4. See Maniam, supra note 1.  
 5. See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE 
UNITED STATES 94 (1987) (identifying several culprits of organized labor’s decline, 
including the movement of industry from the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt, the change of the 
U.S. economy from industrial to service-oriented jobs, the decline in blue-collar jobs, 
changes in the composition of the workforce, and the downsizing of plants). 
 6. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§	151–169 (2012).  
 7. See STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 
1 (4th ed. 1993) (“[T]he law that governs union organizing[] is state and federal law, 
statutory and case law. By far the most significant statutory law is the federal National 
Labor Relations Act. Likewise, the most important labor case law is made by the National 
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should be an increased focus on how the NLRB enforces the 
provisions of the NLRA.8 
Among its many responsibilities, the NLRB conducts elections in 
which employees vote whether to certify a union as their bargaining 
representative.9 Union elections are an integral part of the 
unionization process and heavily depend on the NLRB’s policies.10 As 
important as elections can be, the makeup of the voting unit largely 
determines the outcome.11 In order to vote in a union election, an 
employee must have a job that is within an approved unit of 
workers.12 Typically, a unit is formed as follows: A union organizer 
begins to build support among employees in a workplace to seek 
union representation.13 The union organizer often targets a subset of 
the workforce to build initial support for union representation.14 
Though not all employees in the subset may support union 
representation, the union will proceed toward an election when it 
determines that a majority of the employees in a unit15 want the union 
to represent them in collective bargaining.16 If the union and the 
employer cannot agree on the size of the unit that will hold an 
 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which administers the Act, and by the federal courts. 
The federal law plays the paramount role .	.	. because of .	.	. preemption .	.	.	.”). 
 8. National Labor Relations Act §	1, 29 U.S.C. §	151 (2012). 
 9. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, NLRB Elections: Ambush or Anticlimax?, 64 EMORY L.J. 
1647, 1651–52 (2015) (discussing certification elections generally). 
 10. See SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 214–15 (discussing the complicated 
procedure of organizing and suggesting a need to retain counsel to navigate NLRB 
representation cases). 
 11. See PAUL M. SECUNDA, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH & MICHAEL C. DUFF, LABOR LAW: 
A PROBLEM-BASED APPROACH 364–65 (2d ed. 2017) (describing the process of 
determining an “appropriate bargaining unit”); see also JOHN E. ABODEELY, RANDI C. 
HAMMER & ANDREW L. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING 
UNIT 3 (rev. ed. 1981) (“Attaining a favorable delineation of the size of the bargaining unit 
is often the focus of dispute between competing unions and between union and 
management.”). 
 12. Richard A. Kaminsky, Overview of the Law, and the Basic Manufacturing Unit, in 
APPROPRIATE UNITS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1, 1 (Peter G. Nash & George P. 
Blake eds., 1979). 
 13. See ROBERT LEWIS & WILLIAM A. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: 
MANAGEMENT’S STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 27 (2d ed. 1979) (“A union 
commences an organizing campaign by assigning an individual to the company. He may 
have any one of a number of titles: organizer, business agent or representative.”). 
 14. See id. at 28–29. 
 15. See SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 216 (“The bargaining unit is that 
group of employees that is represented by the union in collective bargaining.”). The size of 
a unit will vary, but this Recent Development focuses on “micro-units,” where the 
petitioned-for unit does not encompass all employees. 
 16. See id. at 216–17 (“The union will normally urge the appropriateness of a unit in 
which it feels it has a good chance to win a majority.”). 
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election, the union must petition the NLRB to approve the unit.17 
When there is a union petition, the employer will usually contend that 
the unit should not be approved for an election.18 
When petitioning the NLRB, the union usually proposes small 
bargaining units because it is easier to build majority support for a 
union among fewer, more similarly situated employees.19 In contrast, 
the employer traditionally argues for larger units so that it can 
bargain with a greater number of employees, and because a larger 
unit is less likely to produce a consensus for unionization.20 Because 
both the union and the employer know that the size of the unit can 
determine the outcome of an election, unit determination is a heavily 
litigated and contentious issue.21 In such cases, the employees or an 
organization acting on their behalf files the petition,22 and the NLRB 
must decide whether the proposed unit is appropriate for collective 
bargaining.23 
The NLRB’s authority to determine whether a unit is 
appropriate comes from the NLRA.24 Section 9(b) of the Act 
provides that “[t]he Board shall decide in each case whether, in order 
to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights 
guaranteed by this [Act], the unit appropriate for the purposes of 
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, 
or subdivision thereof.”25 The “rights” referred to in section 9(b) are 
found in section 7 and include the right to self-organize, to join labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives, and to 
 
 17. See id.; see also Kaminsky, supra note 12, at 1 (explaining that a petition is needed 
when the employer and the union fail to agree on the appropriate size of a unit). 
 18. SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 216 (“The employer will often approach 
the question of appropriateness with an eye toward defining a unit in which the union 
cannot achieve a majority.”). 
 19. See id.; see also SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 11, at 365 (describing tension 
between unions and employers as to the size and type of bargaining units). In addition, 
data supports the theory that a smaller unit has a greater likelihood of winning an election. 
See Gordon R. Pavy, Winning NLRB Elections and Establishing Collective Bargaining 
Relationships, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 110, 116–18 
(Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).  
 20. SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 217. 
 21. See id. at 216–17; see also Kaminsky, supra note 12, at 1 (“The determination of 
the appropriate unit is critically important, because it is only the group of employees 
within that unit that will be permitted to vote in an election to determine whether a 
particular union shall be the collective bargaining representative.”). 
 22. National Labor Relations Act §	9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §	159(c)(1)(A) (2012).  
 23. Id. §	9(b). 
 24. Id. §§	1–19. 
 25. Id. §	9(b) (emphasis added). 
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engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, as 
well as the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.26 
The NLRB’s standard to determine whether a petitioned-for unit 
is appropriate has recently changed on two occasions. In 2011, the 
NLRB reformulated old standards to develop the “overwhelming 
community-of-interest” test in Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation 
Center of Mobile.27 In 2017, the NLRB overturned Specialty 
Healthcare when it returned to the “community-of-interest”28 test in 
PCC Structurals, Inc.29  
With the NLRB changing its standard twice in just six years, 
three observations can be made. First, the change from the Specialty 
Healthcare standard to the PCC Structurals standard may appear 
subtle, but its consequences are enormous.30 PCC Structurals is 
undoubtedly a pro-employer standard because it abandons the 
Specialty Healthcare deference given to petitioned-for units.31 Second, 
both the overwhelming community-of-interest test and the 
community-of-interest test adhere to the principles of section 9 of the 
NLRA. In other words, both tests are legally permissible.32 Third, the 
 
 26. Id. §	7 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of 
such activities .	.	.	.”). 
 27. See generally Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. 934, 934 
(2011), overruled by PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017). 
 28. A “community of interest” is a group that has “similar interests in wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment.”See Kaminsky, supra note 12, at 3. 
 29. See generally PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160, at 1 (Dec. 15, 2017). 
 30. The reactions to either test are often visceral. See, e.g., David Pryzbylski, NLRB 
Continues to Cite Its Infamous Specialty Healthcare Decision When Affirming Funky 
Bargaining Units, LEXOLOGY: LAB. REL. (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=fb41a2c9-242e-4707-bf0d-7084fd22c5a2 [https://perma.cc/YA2D-VB25]. 
But see Michael J. Lebowich & Lee C. Douthitt, “Micro-Units” Eliminated: NLRB Overturns 
Specialty Healthcare, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/micro-units-eliminated-nlrb-overturns-specialty-healthcare [https://perma.cc/UU44-
8NJK] (reporting on the overruling of Specialty Healthcare). Also, because one standard is 
pro-employer and the other is pro-employee, the chances that the NLRB will swing back 
and forth between the two with every political change in the executive branch are high. 
Because unit determination is such an important stage in unionizing, an ever-changing 
standard would be unduly frustrating. 
 31. See Danielle Garcia, The End of Union-Dictated Micro-Units: NLRB Overturns 
Specialty Healthcare, SHEPPARDMULLIN: LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2017/12/articles/national-labor-relations-act/
nlrb-overturns-specialty-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/ZD9Z-X2ML] (“On the eve of 
Chairman Phillip Miscimarra’s departure from the NLRB, he gave one final gift to 
employers: the overturning of Specialty Healthcare .	.	.	.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Rhino Nw., LLC. v. NLRB, 867 F.3d 95, 100–01 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(upholding Specialty Healthcare); Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC. v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552, 
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most complete way to differentiate the two tests is to analyze which 
test “assure[s] to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the 
rights guaranteed by [the Act],” pursuant to the section 9(b) mandate 
of the NLRA.33 
This Recent Development explores a third observation—that the 
best method for deciding which test the NLRB should follow is to 
compare how they assure to employees their “fullest freedom” under 
the NLRA. If the NLRB must decide whether a petitioned-for unit is 
“appropriate” pursuant to section 9(b) in order to assure to 
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by 
the Act, then the “freedom” given to employees in section 7 deserve a 
workable framework.34 Analyzing the effects on employee freedom in 
unit determination is especially important considering that unit 
determination cases create tension between employees and the rights 
they want to exercise.35 In short, this Recent Development thoroughly 
analyzes how a section 9(b) standard affects the freedom of 
employees, something the NLRB failed to do in PCC Structurals. 
This Recent Development proposes a hierarchy of “Section 7 
Stakeholders” as a framework in deciding which test—Specialty 
Healthcare’s overwhelming community-of-interest standard or PCC 
Structurals’s community-of-interest standard—better fulfills the goals 
of the NLRA. It will proceed in three parts. Part I provides a more 
thorough background of PCC Structurals and the history of the 
section 9(b) standards the NLRB has used. Part II proposes a 
hierarchy of Section 7 Stakeholders and explains why such a 
framework is necessary for the NLRB to fulfill its section 9(b) duty of 
determining whether a unit is appropriate for collective bargaining. 
Part III then explores how the framework should be used to compare 
the two standards. 
I.  BACKGROUND TO PCC STRUCTURALS, INC. 
In PCC Structurals, the NLRB reviewed a “Regional Director’s 
Decision and Direction of Election” finding that a petitioned-for unit 
 
564–65 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding Specialty Healthcare). In addition, federal courts only 
reverse a unit determination when they find an “abuse of discretion.” See Kaminsky, supra 
note 12, at 2. 
 33. National Labor Relations Act §	9(b), 29 U.S.C. §	159(b) (2012). In PCC 
Structurals, the NLRB attempted to perform this analysis but did so incompletely. See 
PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 5. The “rights” given to employees under the NLRA are 
found in section 7. National Labor Relations Act §	7, 29 U.S.C. §	157 (2012). 
 34. The NLRB has not fully addressed how either standard affords employees their 
fullest freedom under the Act. 
 35. See infra Part II.  
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of approximately 100 welders and rework specialists was appropriate 
for collective bargaining.36 The employer disagreed with the Regional 
Director’s determination that the unit of welders and rework 
specialists was appropriate.37 Instead, the employer asserted that the 
smallest appropriate unit for collective bargaining was all 2565 
production and maintenance employees.38 The NLRB granted review 
to clarify the applicable standard for determining whether a 
petitioned-for unit is appropriate for collective bargaining.39 
The NLRB’s authority to “clarify the correct standard”40 comes 
from section 9(b) of the NLRA.41 Section 9(b) grants the NLRB sole 
discretion to choose a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.42 In addition, the goal of the NLRB’s decision is to give 
employees their fullest freedom to exercise their rights under the 
NLRA.43 
In its review, the NLRB overturned Specialty Healthcare.44 To 
understand the rule from PCC Structurals, it is important to first 
understand the standard established in Specialty Healthcare that the 
Board overturned. Under Specialty Healthcare, the NLRB first 
determines whether the employees within the petitioned-for unit 
share a community of interest together.45 Second, the NLRB analyzes 
whether the excluded employees46 share an overwhelming community 
of interest with the unit.47 If the NLRB finds that the excluded 
 
 36. PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 1. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. The 2565 employees spanned approximately 120 different job classifications. 
Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. National Labor Relations Act §	9(b), 29 U.S.C. §	159(b) (2012); cf. SECUNDA ET 
AL., supra note 11, at 364 (explaining that for the purpose of NLRB unit determination, a 
unit consists of job classifications rather than particular workers.). 
 42. §	9(b); see also id. §	9(c)(5) (“[T]he extent to which the employees have organized 
shall not be controlling.”); SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 11, at 365 (stating that the NLRB 
must decide only on an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit). 
 43. §	9(b). 
 44. PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 1 (“Today, we clarify the correct standard for 
determining whether a proposed bargaining unit constitutes an appropriate unit for 
collective bargaining when the employer contends that the smallest appropriate unit must 
include additional employees. In so doing, and for the reasons explained below, we 
overrule the Board’s decision in Specialty Healthcare .	.	.	.”). 
 45. Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. 934, 947 (2011), 
overruled by PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017).  
 46. “Excluded employees” are those employees who are not in the petitioned-for unit 
but are among the employees in the unit proposed by the employer. See PCC Structurals, 
365 N.L.R.B. at 1. 
 47. Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. at 947. 
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employees share an overwhelming community of interest with the 
petitioned-for unit, then the NLRB rules that the petitioned-for unit 
is inappropriate.48 The NLRB then creates a new unit by adding the 
employees who have an overwhelming community of interest, and 
this new unit proceeds to an election.49 The NLRB in Specialty 
Healthcare recognized that its overwhelming community-of-interest 
test was a “heightened showing.”50 By requiring the other party (i.e., 
the employer) to show that the excluded employees had an 
overwhelming community of interest with the unit such that their 
exclusion made the petitioned-for unit inappropriate, the NLRB 
implicitly prioritized the freedom of the employees within the unit. 
PCC Structurals abandoned the prioritization of petitioned-for 
unit employees and their section 7 rights over excluded employees. 
Instead, the NLRB reaffirmed that the traditional community-of-
interest test should be applied to all employees—both inside and 
outside of the petitioned-for unit.51 Under this standard, the NLRB 
determines, “in each case in which unit appropriateness is questioned, 
whether the employees in a petitioned-for group share a community 
of interest sufficiently distinct from the interests of employees 
excluded from the petitioned-for group to warrant a finding that the 
proposed group constitutes a separate appropriate unit.”52 
In PCC Structurals, the NLRB defended its decision to 
implement the community-of-interest test as the standard to use when 
determining the appropriateness of an employee unit pursuant to 
section 9(b) on multiple grounds. First, the NLRB explained that 
petitioned-for units should not be determinative and that the NLRB 
 
 48. Id. at 945–46. 
 49. See id.; see also PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 17 (Pearce, M., & McFerran, M., 
dissenting). 
 50. Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. at 944; see also PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. 
at 20. Specialty Healthcare essentially made a value distinction between employees 
petitioning the NLRB as a unit and those employees who were excluded from the unit. 
 51. PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 12 (majority opinion); see also ABODEELY ET 
AL., supra note 11, at 11–12 (“[The Board] has identified a number of factors that it 
examines on a case-by-case basis to determine if there exists the ‘community of interests’ 
necessary to make that unit appropriate.”). 
 52. PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 5. Factors the Board considers are whether: (1) 
“the employees are organized into a separate department”; (2) “have distinct skills and 
training”; (3) “have distinct job functions and perform distinct work, including inquiry into 
the amount and type of job overlap between classifications”; (4) “are functionally 
integrated with the Employer’s other employees”; (5) “interchange with other 
employees”; (6) “have distinct terms and conditions of employment”; and (7) “are 
separately supervised.” Id. (quoting United Operations, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 123, 123 
(2002)). 
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gives no deference to the unit that it is asked to review.53 Second, the 
NLRB argued that the community-of-interest test prevents units from 
being “arbitrary, irrational, or ‘fractured.’”54 Third, the NLRB 
suggested that the test “ensures that the Section 7 rights of excluded 
employees .	.	. are taken into consideration.”55 The first and second 
reasons are succinctly explained in the PCC Structurals opinion.56 
However, the NLRB appropriately made its most pointed assertion 
by comparing the affected section 7 rights of employees under its 
community-of-interest test to Specialty Healthcare’s overwhelming 
community-of-interest test.57 The NLRB’s focus was appropriate 
because section 9(b) instructs the NLRB to make its decision on the 
basis of protecting the “fullest freedom[s]” of employees under the 
NLRA, which are the protections given under section 7. 
Though the NLRB focused on the right issue, it fell short on its 
evaluation of both standards and how they address section 7 rights of 
all employees. The NLRB summarized its position by stating that  
we find that considering the interests of excluded employees 
along with those in the petitioned-for unit, without the 
‘overwhelming’ community-of-interest requirement, better 
effectuates the policies and purposes of the Act, which requires 
the Board to ‘assure to employees the fullest freedom in 
exercising the rights guaranteed by [the] Act.’58  
But how? The NLRB in PCC Structurals failed to explain why the 
community-of-interest test is the better standard for effecting the 
purpose of the NLRA. 
The NLRB’s failure to fully examine whether its legal standard 
was aligned with the goals of the controlling statute—especially when 
it was overturning another legally valid standard—is unacceptable. 
This flaw leads to this Recent Development’s proposed framework in 
 
 53. Id. (“The required assessment of whether the sought-after employees’ interests 
are sufficiently distinct from those of employees excluded from the petitioned-for group 
provides some assurance that extent of organizing will not be determinative, consistent 
with Section 9(c)(5) .	.	.	.”). 
 54. Id. (explaining that the standard used for unit determination prevents the 
grouping of employees who do not have distinct interests from those outside the unit). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 8 (explaining that section 9 of the NLRA favors the community-of-
interest test because it does not give to the petitioned-for unit an “artificial supremacy” 
that would impede the NLRB’s authority to determine the appropriateness of an 
employee unit). 
 57. Id. at 5–8. 
 58. Id. at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting National Labor Relations Act §	9(b), 29 
U.S.C. §	159(b) (2012)). 
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Part II that eliminates the vagueness upon which the NLRB relies. 
The framework is a hierarchy of Section 7 Stakeholders, and it aims 
to supply the NLRB with an analytical tool to use whenever the 
NLRB re-evaluates its section 9(b) standard so that the standard 
actually assures to employees their fullest freedom under the Act. 
II.  A PROPOSAL FOR SECTION 7 STAKEHOLDERS 
In unit determination cases, section 9(b) unequivocally grants the 
NLRB the authority to decide which employee unit is appropriate for 
collective bargaining with the employer.59 In the statute, the word 
“appropriate” does not stand alone, but rather it is followed by “for 
the purposes of collective bargaining.”60 Additionally, the statute 
provides that the NLRB decision, in each case, is “to assure to 
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by 
this [Act].”61 Thus, any standard that assists the NLRB in making its 
decision must comply with two statutory requirements: (1) the 
authorized unit must be appropriate for collective bargaining 
purposes and (2) employees should have the fullest freedom in 
exercising their rights under the NLRA. 
Employee rights are found in section 7 of the NLRA.62 As the 
NLRB noted in PCC Structurals, section 7 gives employees the right 
to engage in an assortment of concerted activities, as well as the right 
to refrain from any such activity.63 Thus, in a unit determination case, 
there are naturally four categories of Section 7 Stakeholders: (1) 
employees who are within the petitioned-for unit and wish to exercise 
their section 7 right to concerted activity; (2) employees who are 
within the petitioned-for unit and wish to exercise their right to 
refrain from concerted activity; (3) employees who are outside of the 
petitioned-for unit and wish to exercise their section 7 right to 
concerted activity; and (4) employees who are outside of the 
petitioned-for unit and wish to exercise their right to refrain from 
concerted activity. Quite simply, a Section 7 Stakeholder is an 
employee with protected section 7 rights that are implicated 
differently than the rights of other employees when the NLRB 
determines an appropriate unit. 
For example, consider the facts in PCC Structurals. In that case, a 
union vying to represent a unit of approximately 100 welders and 
 
 59. National Labor Relations Act §	9(b), 29 U.S.C. §	159(b) (2012). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. §	7. 
 63. PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 4; see also §	7. 
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rework specialists petitioned the NLRB to recognize the group as an 
appropriate unit to collectively bargain with the employer.64 The 
employer contended that the unit should include all 2565 plant 
employees.65 Thus, for purposes of this Recent Development, PCC 
Structurals includes 2565 Section 7 Stakeholders, all of whom fall into 
one of the four categories described above. 
“Category 1” consists of employees who are within the 
petitioned-for unit of 100 welders and rework specialists and want to 
exercise their section 7 right to collectively bargain. These are the 
welders and rework specialists who, after the NLRB approves their 
unit, would vote “yes” to union representation. 
“Category 2” is comprised of employees who are also within this 
unit, but want to refrain from concerted activity. These are welders or 
rework specialists who would vote “no” to union representation and 
refrain from union membership if the union won the vote. 
“Category 3” includes employees who are outside of the 
petitioned-for unit but want to exercise their section 7 right to 
concerted activity. These employees may wish to join the petitioned-
for unit of welders and rework specialists, or they may wish to create 
their own collective bargaining unit. 
“Category 4” refers to employees who are outside of the 
petitioned-for unit but want to refrain from concerted activity. They 
are the employees who, if the NLRB found that the employer-
proposed unit of 2565 employees is the appropriate unit, would vote 
“no” to unionization at the plant. They would never engage in union 
membership. 
Given that section 9(b) instructs the NLRB to afford to all 
employees their fullest freedom in their section 7 rights, any standard 
that fails to anticipate the effects of an NLRB unit determination on 
each Section 7 Stakeholder is inadequate.66 What makes unit 
determination cases unique is that they pit the section 7 rights of 
employees against each other.67 Thus, if the NLRB is to achieve the 
section 9(b) aim to provide the fullest freedom to all employees, then 
it must concede that a hierarchy of Section 7 Stakeholders allows it to 
prioritize the rights of employees, and it must assess the implications 
 
 64. PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 1. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 13 (Pearce, M., & McFerran, M., dissenting) (“It is a foundational 
principle of United States labor law that .	.	. the Board in overseeing this process should be 
conducted with the paramount goal of ensuring that employees have ‘the fullest freedom 
in exercising the rights guaranteed by’ the Act.”). 
 67. See id. at 8 (majority opinion). 
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of a unit determination on every type of employee. Without it, the 
NLRB is susceptible to continuing the questionable, conclusory 
reasoning exemplified in PCC Structurals.68 Therefore, this Recent 
Development suggests a hierarchy of Section 7 Stakeholders that can 
create a workable framework for the NLRB. 
A. Category 1 Employees Should Receive the Highest Priority 
As described above, Category 1 refers to those employees who 
are within a petitioned-for unit and want to exercise their section 7 
right to join a labor organization and collectively bargain. When 
reviewing the appropriateness of a unit, the NLRB should prioritize 
the fullest freedom of Category 1 employees for the following 
reasons. 
First, Category 1 employees should receive the highest priority 
because their desire to collectively bargain is consistent with the spirit 
and purpose of the NLRA. The NLRA was passed in 1935 as part of 
the New Deal with “the policy” of eliminating obstacles to the “free 
flow of commerce .	.	. by encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing .	.	.	.”69 Congress passed the 
NLRA with pro-employee, pro-collective-bargaining intentions.70 
Though the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 added the “right to 
refrain” to section 7,71 the goal of the NLRA is still to protect 
employees’ right to engage in concerted activity.72 
 
 68. See, e.g., id. 
 69. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§	151–169 (2012)). 
 70. See SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 11, at 20 (“The Wagner Act was a conscious, 
carefully thought out program .	.	. [with a] concern exclusively with employer wrongdoing, 
not union wrongdoing .	.	.	.”). 
 71. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, §	7, 61 Stat. 
136, 140 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §	157 (2012)); see also SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 
11, at 21 (“Section 7 was also modified to give employees the right to refrain from 
organizing, collective bargaining, and engaging in concerted activities for mutual aid and 
protection.”). 
 72. See National Labor Relations Act §	1, 29 U.S.C. §	151 (2012) (“It is hereby 
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce .	.	. by encouraging the practice and procedure 
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual 
aid or protection.”); see also Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor Relations Act Was 
Stolen and How It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism and the National Labor 
Relations Board’s Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 29 
97 N.C. L. REV. 464 (2019) 
2019] SECTION 7 STAKEHOLDERS 475 
Second, section 9(b) expressly describes “appropriate” as 
applying to “the purposes of collective bargaining.”73 Thus, the reason 
the NLRB decides on an appropriate unit is to create a unit that will 
eventually engage in collective bargaining. The point at which unit 
determination occurs in the unionization process is key. Elections 
take place after unit approval,74 which is why the size of the unit is a 
contentious battle—it can affect whether the vote to unionize is 
affirmative or negative.75 Rather than ignoring the obvious fact that 
unit litigation is more about the parties positioning themselves for a 
favorable election than their earnest belief in what is most 
appropriate, the NLRB should factor this reality into its decision 
making. This fact need not be a major influence, but considering 
whether the employees in a unit will actually engage in collective 
bargaining seems to fit the mandate of section 9(b). In addition, 
Category 1 employees are the ones who want to exercise this right.76 
The first two reasons fail to differentiate Category 1 and 
Category 3 employees. Yet there is an additional consideration in 
granting Category 1 employees the highest priority in exercising their 
section 7 rights. Plainly, Category 1 employees should be rewarded 
for creating a petitioned-for unit that brings their section 7 rights to 
the cusp of being exercised.77 The counterargument to this 
preferential treatment is that section 9(c)(5) provides that “[i]n 
determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified 
in subsection (b) [of this section] the extent to which the employees 
have organized shall not be controlling.”78 Thus, it would appear that 
 
(“[S]tatutory text and legislative history confirm that the ‘right to refrain’—or any of its 
metamorphosed ‘free choice’ versions—is neither a replacement for the primary and 
statutorily described ‘policy of the United States [of] encouraging collective-bargaining’ 
nor a statutory coequal of that policy.” (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. §	151 (2006))).  
 73. National Labor Relations Act §	9(b), 29 U.S.C. §	159(b) (2012). 
 74. See SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 216 (“Although there is, naturally, 
little talk of it in either the parties’ arguments or in the Board’s decisions, what is most 
basically at stake in contested bargaining-unit determinations is the likelihood of election 
victory.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. To illustrate again under PCC Structurals, these are the welders and rework 
specialists whose apparent support of the union would lead to a petitioning of the NLRB. 
See PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160, at 1 n.1 (Dec. 15, 2017).The election that 
took place had a tally of fifty-four to thirty-eight for the petitioner. Id. 
 77. Petitioned-for units do not appear out of thin air. They are a product of petitions 
showing support of a union, investigations, and negotiations. See Conduct Elections, 
NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections 
[https://perma.cc/9PJA-SKN8]. 
 78. National Labor Relations Act §	9(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. §	159(c)(5) (2012). 
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giving deference to the proposed unit is inconsistent with the NLRA. 
Yet granting some deference is different than allowing a proposed 
unit to be “controlling.”79 Moreover, there can be multiple unionized 
units in a workforce.80 Therefore, Category 3 employees continue to 
have their own right to seek unionization even if the petitioned-for 
unit is approved. 
B. Category 2 Employees Should Receive the Second-Highest 
Priority 
As discussed, Category 2 employees are inside the petitioned-for 
unit and do not want to exercise their section 7 right to join a labor 
organization and collectively bargain. When reviewing the 
appropriateness of a unit, the NLRB should give the second-highest 
priority to the fullest freedom of Category 2 employees. 
The placement of Category 2 employees in the hierarchy of 
Section 7 Stakeholders comes down to a fundamental question: Does 
a unit determination by the NLRB affect the ability of Category 2 
employees to refrain from concerted activity more than it affects the 
ability of Category 3 employees to engage in concerted activity? The 
answer is that it does.  
First, the right to refrain from concerted activity is more than the 
freedom to vote “no” in a union election.81 It is a freedom not to 
engage in certain organized activities.82 However, when a union 
represents a group of employees, it must represent every single 
employee within the unit.83 Therefore, being included in an employee 
unit will subject Category 2 employees to union representation if the 
unit ultimately votes for the union. Given that the result of the 
election is largely determined by the size and makeup of the 
 
 79. See Kaminsky, supra note 12, at 4–5 (“[T]he Supreme Court in NLRB v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. held that the provision was not intended to prohibit the 
Board from considering the extent of organization as one factor, though not the 
controlling factor, in a unit determination.”). 
 80. Id. at 5. 
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 27 (1947) (“[T]he Board will be prevented from 
compelling employees to exercise such rights against their will, as it has consistently done 
in the past. In other words, when Congress grants to employees the right to engage in 
specified activities, it also means to grant them the right to refrain from engaging therein if 
they do not wish to do so.”). 
 82. Morris, supra note 72, at 32 (describing how the provision’s “limited scope” 
nonetheless protects employees against coercion from unions to participate in a strike).  
 83. MARTIN H. MALIN & LORRAINE A. SCHMALL, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN 
THE UNION 376 (1988) (“A union serves as exclusive bargaining representative for all 
employees in the bargaining unit regardless of whether they are union members.”). 
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employee unit,84 there is a big difference for Category 2 employees in 
whether the overwhelming community-of-interest test or the 
community-of-interest test is used. If Specialty Healthcare governs, 
then the petitioned-for unit in which Category 2 employees find 
themselves has a greater likelihood of being approved, which would 
result in a lesser chance of Category 2 employees exercising their 
freedom to refrain from concerted activities and union 
representation. 
Second, Category 2 employees have a temporal consideration 
that Category 3 employees do not have. Once a unit is formed and a 
union is elected as the bargaining representative, the union typically 
lasts for the life of the collective bargaining agreement.85 Under the 
NLRA, there can be no minority union, meaning that the union that 
represents the unit represents all employees within that unit, and the 
members who are dissatisfied with the representation cannot form 
another union for minority representation.86 However, there can be 
multiple employee units that bargain with the employer.87 If Category 
3 employees are left out of the petitioned-for unit, they would have 
the right under the NLRA to create their own unit and seek to 
collectively bargain separately from the unit that already exists. This 
temporal consideration implicates Category 2 employees more than 
Category 3 employees in unit determination cases. 
C. Category 3 Employees Should Receive the Third-Highest Priority 
As previously noted, Category 3 employees are those employees 
who fall outside of the petitioned-for unit and want to exercise their 
section 7 right to join a labor organization and collectively bargain. 
When reviewing the appropriateness of a unit, the NLRB should give 
the third-highest priority to the fullest freedom of Category 3 
employees. 
Category 3 employees should receive the third-highest priority 
because they share similar traits to Category 1 employees: the desire 
to collectively bargain and to organize for the purpose of improving 
working conditions, which are both in line with the spirit and purpose 
 
 84. See SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 216. 
 85. See Madison Alder, ‘Micro-Unit’ Reversal Could Weaken Health Worker Unions’ 
Clout, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.bna.com/microunit-reversal-weaken-
n73014462572/ [https://perma.cc/65YW-3FMS]. 
 86. See Catherine Fisk & Xenia Tashlitsky, Imagine a World Where Employers Are 
Required to Bargain with Minority Unions, 27 ABA J. OF LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 1–2 (2011). 
 87. Kaminsky, supra note 12, at 5–6. 
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of the NLRA.88 Though the freedom that Category 3 employees want 
to exercise are aligned with the purpose of the NLRA, there is 
nothing in a unit determination that prevents them from exercising 
these rights. It may be preferable to join a petitioned-for unit but 
being excluded from the unit does not preclude Category 3 employees 
from creating their own unit of workers and building union support 
among them.89 
Moreover, it is less clear which test Category 3 employees would 
prefer. Under PCC Structurals, they have a greater chance of being 
included in the petitioned-for unit, but their presence—along with 
that of Category 4 employees—may not guarantee that the union 
wins the election. But, under Specialty Healthcare, they would have to 
show an overwhelming community of interest to join the unit, so their 
odds of inclusion would be low under this standard. Therefore, 
though Category 3 employees have rights under section 7 like all 
employees, a unit determination does not affect their rights as greatly 
as employees in the first two categories. 
D. Category 4 Employees Should Receive the Lowest Priority 
Category 4 employees are those who are excluded from the 
petitioned-for unit and wish to refrain from engaging in concerted 
activity. Their right to refrain from concerted activity and general 
desire to avoid union representation is protected if they are excluded 
from the unit. Also, those employees’ right to refrain from concerted 
activity is unlikely to be implicated if they are included in the unit 
because the vote to unionize would likely result in a “no” for union 
representation.90 There is an argument that the risk of being included 
in a unit that ultimately votes “yes” to unionization is enough to 
implicate Category 4 employees more than Category 3 employees. 
However, the risk is relatively low, and the purpose of the NLRA 
should still matter. Though section 7 protects employees’ right to 
refrain from concerted activity, the NLRA as a whole does not exist 
as a “protection” for workers to avoid working collectively toward 
 
 88. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK 97–100 (2005) (“When 
the Supreme Court recognized that ‘the right of employees to self-organization and to 
select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining .	.	. is a fundamental 
right,’ it was correctly characterizing congressional intent .	.	.	.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937))). 
 89. See id. at 99. 
 90. See SECUNDA ET AL., supra note 11, at 365 (explaining that employers prefer 
larger units because it is harder for unions to garner a majority support); see also Pavy, 
supra note 19, at 116–18 (using data from 1970, 1982, and 1987 to show that smaller units 
are more likely to succeed in votes to unionize).  
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improved working conditions.91 Thus, when some employees desire to 
engage in concerted activity and others hope to refrain from such 
activity, the tie should go to those who want to collectively organize 
when they are both outside of the petitioned-for unit.92 
Overall, the Section 7 Stakeholder hierarchy reveals that a unit 
determination affects the section 7 rights of different employees at 
different magnitudes. The next section explains how this framework 
can influence the NLRB in establishing the proper standard for unit 
determination cases going forward. 
III.  HOW THE SECTION 7 STAKEHOLDER FRAMEWORK CAN 
INFLUENCE THE SECTION 9(B) STANDARD 
Establishing a Section 7 Stakeholder framework with prioritized 
stakeholders still does not complete the analysis of how the NLRB 
should determine the appropriateness of an employee unit. 
Ultimately, the Section 7 Stakeholder framework should be used to 
support either the overwhelming community-of-interest test 
established by Specialty Healthcare93 or the community-of-interest 
standard clarified by PCC Structurals94 as the unequivocal standard 
for unit determination. Though each standard is legally permissible, 
only one test accomplishes the difficult task of assuring to employees 
their “fullest freedom” under the NLRA in a more complete way. For 
this reason, Specialty Healthcare is the more complete standard. 
Undoubtedly, Category 1 employees would prefer Specialty 
Healthcare and its overwhelming community-of-interest standard. 
These employees want their unit to be approved immediately, 
believing that they have the requisite union support to succeed in a 
union election. Under Specialty Healthcare, they would only have to 
show that they themselves share a community of interest together.95 
The burden of arguing that other employees should be allowed in the 
unit would fall on the employer—and the employer would then need 
to show that those excluded employees have an overwhelming 
 
 91. See National Labor Relations Act §	1, 29 U.S.C. §	151 (2012); see also Morris, 
supra note 72, at 29.  
 92. The legislative history of the “right to refrain” shows that the protection is more 
against compulsion than it is a stand-alone right to refrain. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 27 
(1947) (“A committee amendment assures that when the law states that employees are to 
have the rights guaranteed in Section 7, the Board will be prevented from compelling 
employees to exercise such rights against their will .	.	.	.”). 
 93. Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. 934, 944 (2011), 
overruled by PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017). 
 94. PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160, at 1 (Dec. 15, 2017). 
 95. Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. at 934. 
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community of interest with Category 1 employees. This burden is 
difficult to meet.96 In contrast, a PCC Structurals standard would 
lessen this burden, and excluded employees would need only a 
community of interest to be allowed in the unit.97 And as unit 
determination cases go, allowing more employees in the unit usually 
results in a diluted vote that ultimately rejects union representation.98 
Thus, Specialty Healthcare prioritizes the freedom of Category 1 
employees and provides them with the best opportunity to exercise 
them. The preference of Category 1 employees should matter because 
their section 7 rights are most affected in unit determination cases.99 
Interestingly, Category 4 employees would likely favor Specialty 
Healthcare. These employees do not want to be represented by a 
union. Therefore, they would prefer Specialty Healthcare’s higher 
burden. Though Category 4 employees are the lowest in the Section 7 
Stakeholder hierarchy, their preference matters because they are still 
employees with section 7 rights. 
While Category 1 and Category 4 employees likely prefer 
Specialty Healthcare, Category 2 employees probably favor PCC 
Structurals. Category 2 employees would like a standard that allows 
other employees into the unit so that the union election would go in 
their favor. PCC Structurals and its community-of-interest standard 
do just that. Without question, a community-of-interest standard 
gives Category 2 employees their best chance of diluting the unit with 
other employees who are opposed to union representation. 
Category 3 employees are more difficult to predict because it is 
uncertain whether their inclusion into a petitioned-for unit would 
result in an affirmative vote for union representation. Also, these 
employees may prefer to organize their own unit if they believe that 
their interests are different from those employees in the petitioned-
for unit. Whether their chances of exercising their section 7 right to 
concerted activity are better within the petitioned-for unit or a 
separate unit organized at a later time is heavily fact dependent and 
could change in each case. However, at the moment the NLRB hears 
a unit determination case, it seems that Category 3 employees would 
generally prefer the PCC Structurals standard because they are more 
 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 946 (illustrating a showing of an overwhelming community of 
interest where the petitioned-for unit is fractured, i.e., including some employees of a 
certain classification but arbitrarily excluding others within the same classification).  
 97. PCC Structurals, 365 N.L.R.B. at 13. 
 98. See SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 216. 
 99. See supra Section II.A. 
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likely to be included in the unit. This inclusion would at least give the 
employees the opportunity to vote in a union election.100 
Clearly, there is tension not only between the employees in a unit 
determination case but also in the way the two standards afford to 
employees their fullest freedom under the NLRA. It would be 
reasonable to suggest that PCC Structurals provides employees with 
their fullest freedom because it caters to the interests of Category 2 
and possibly Category 3 employees. However, the Section 7 
Stakeholder hierarchy shows that Category 1 employees are most 
affected by unit determinations and that their interest in collective 
bargaining fulfills the goal of the NLRA. PCC Structurals discounts 
the effect that a unit determination case has on employees who have 
organized and are on the cusp of a union election. Employees in this 
position are attempting to exercise their rights to association and 
representation, which are the hallmark protections of the NLRA. 
Though legally permissible, such a standard falls short of the statutory 
aim to assure to employees their fullest freedom. Therefore, Specialty 
Healthcare is the standard that most truly adheres to section 9 and the 
NLRA as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
This Recent Development recognizes that the NLRB has used 
two competing standards for unit determination cases in this decade 
and that both standards are legally permissible under the NLRA.101 
The analysis of which standard better fulfills the goal and mandate of 
the NLRA focuses on which standard assures to employees their 
fullest freedom under the NLRA. To conduct this analysis, this 
Recent Development proposes a Section 7 Stakeholder hierarchy as a 
method for assessing a unit determination’s effect on employees’ 
section 7 rights. Given that employees who are in the unit and want 
union representation are affected the most, Specialty Healthcare is the 
standard that better assures to employees their fullest freedom. 
But what should the NLRB do? The controlling standard is PCC 
Structurals, and given its basis in NLRB precedent, it is certainly a 
permissible standard that will be upheld by the courts. However, this 
 
 100. See Kaminsky, supra note 12, at 1 (“The determination of the appropriate unit is 
critically important, because it is only the group of employees within that unit that will be 
permitted to vote in an election to determine whether a particular union shall be the 
collective bargaining representative.”). 
 101. Moreover, this Recent Development suggests that the standards—given that one 
is pro-employer and the other is pro-employee—are likely to be adopted or discarded 
whenever the NLRB is ideologically capable of choosing its preferred standard. 
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Recent Development urges the NLRB to do more. Undoubtedly, unit 
determination litigation will persist. Moreover, the political makeup 
of the NLRB will continue to change. And with both of these realities 
comes the inevitability that the NLRB will hear challenges to PCC 
Structurals in the future. This Recent Development provides the 
NLRB and litigants with a workable framework for analyzing how 
each standard differs in its ability to provide to employees their fullest 
freedom under the NLRA. It also argues that Specialty Healthcare 
accomplishes this difficult task in a more complete way. No matter 
which standard the NLRB chooses to follow in the future, it should at 
least be held accountable for a complete effort in determining 
whether its standard assures to employees their fullest freedom under 
the NLRA. 
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